Economic isolationism – with threats of tariffs on foreign-made goods – is a key plank of Trump’s Maga Republicanism. But it will probably cause traditional US partners such as France and Germany to seek to grow the European single market while also developing new economic partnerships.
Isolationism does have an established history in the US. It led to decisive but late interventions in both world wars, and to over a decade of non-intervention after the Vietnam War.
A significant withdrawal of American military and economic capabilities from Nato, in particular, will require the European powers to push more public money into defence and security – generating stronger European defence and security identities as they began to do in the early 2000s with the St Malo process, which led to the early European Security and Defence Policy, a regional security plan.
Any shift away from the US security guarantee would make countries east of Germany more vulnerable to Russia’s military threat, and sabotage, for up to ten years. Funded and coordinated properly, however, this risk can be mitigated; countries including Sweden and Estonia have already started increasing their military budgets.
Intelligence
Trump has been deeply suspicious of American intelligence agencies in the past, stating that he trusted the word of Putin over the assessment of the CIA. He has also become increasingly attached to the idea of a hostile (and fictional) “deep state” trying to prevent him acting in the best interests of the American people.
Intelligence agencies seek to “speak best truth” to power. But Trump’s first stint in the White House shed light on a president who was apparently unusually unwilling to read his presidential Daily Brief (the premier intelligence assessment product in the US system). He also seemed to lack care with classified documents and information, and fundamentally did not trust this crucial tool of the state.
The challenge for those outside the US is whether a second Trump presidency would make American intelligence agencies unreliable partners. This will be a particular concern for the Five Eyes alliance of intelligence powers (US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), a key pillar of western security.
Democracy
Admiration for both Russia (and Putin) and North Korea (and Kim Jong Un) featured in Trump’s first presidency. Expanding this support and turning a blind eye to international lawbreaking activities would be challenging for other nations.
Similarly, the potential loss of the US as a democratic beacon would be significant. An example is Trump’s recent “joke” about near-dictatorial powers, with him indicating that 2024 would be the last time Americans need vote in a presidential election. US allies need to be prepared for a growing misalignment around freedoms, surveillance, extradition and restrictions on free trade.
A realignment of alliances and values in the west – part of the agenda Trump has already articulated – will be particularly dangerous in the context of expansionist states such as Russia and China. The freeing of Russian assassin Vadim Krasikov as part of a prisoner swap may give Putin more confidence about his impunity from the consequences of any illegal actions ordered outside Russian borders, and could lead to more threats in the west.
Trump’s tactics should not be seen as a surprise. They need to be planned for, financed, and procured for. Pretending they are surprising because they are uncomfortable is not a plan.
This article by Professor Robert Dover was originally published on The Conversation. The views or opinions expressed by individuals do not necessarily reflect those of the University.