

Vigilant Jewish Fundamentalism: From the JDL to Kach (or 'Shalom Jews, Shalom Dogs')

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'What is hateful to you do not do unto your fellow people.'

Hillel (Babylonian Talmud, Sabbath 31a)

'This was neither the right time nor the right place to apply such rules.'

Meir Kahane

The essay aims to explain the emergence of Kahanism in Israel and why Israeli democracy saw it necessary to defend itself against Kahane's quasi-fascist ideas and to curtail his legitimacy. The author reflects on the Kahanist phenomenon, its ideology and political programme which brought Rabbi Kahane to the Knesset. The reading of Kach's racist proposals explains why extraordinary measures were taken against Kahane by the political system as well as by the media and the educational system.

I. Introduction

This essay¹ reflects on the late Meir Kahane, his ideology and his political programme. It casts light on Kahane's activities in the United States and Israel, deliberating on the principal ideas which made Kahane the enemy of the establishment. The reading of his proposals will explain the notion of urgency that prevailed during the 1980s in the struggle against Kahanism. The notion was that the Israeli democracy should defend itself against the quasi-fascist phenomenon introduced by Kahane. Thus the article explains why extraordinary measures were taken against Kahane's movement (Kach) not only by the political system, but also by the media and the educational system. These measures included attempts to delegitimize Kach and to obstruct its activities.

I conclude by asserting that Kahane's ideas have gained deep roots in Israeli society. That said, it has to be emphasised that I am not arguing that anti-democratic, racist ideas have only emerged since Kahane's ideas became known to the public; rather that these ideas were discussed more in the open as a result of Kahane's activity on the political scene, and that he helped establish them as part of the political agenda. It would take a

long process of education, accompanied by a significant political effort to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in order to change the current feelings towards the Arab minority, and the status of that minority in society.

II. The Kahanist Phenomenon

In June 1968 Meir Martin Kahane, together with Bertram Zweibon and Morton Dolinsky, founded the Jewish Defence League (JDL). The slogan that was adopted was 'Never Again',² and the symbol was of the Jewish Magen David together with a clenched fist. At first the main aim was to fight against anti-Semitism and more specifically to defend the Jews of New York from black attacks. The emphasis was on a return to Jewish roots, combined with physical and quasi-military training involving the use of weapons. Later, the JDL became more and more involved in the struggle for Soviet Jewry. In December 1969 Kahane announced that henceforth the league's primary concern would be Soviet Jewry. The league opened a campaign against the Soviet Union: it suggested a boycott of American companies trading with the USSR; disrupted Russian cultural events; had members phone Soviet agencies and residences in the United States day and night; harassed Soviet diplomats, and generally made the lives of Soviet delegates in the United States difficult.³

At the peak of its success, the JDL organization had some 19,000 members throughout the United States and in several other countries. This was in the year following the 1977 Skokie affair.⁴ However, Kahane and the JDL never gained the support of the leading Jewish organizations. The Jewish leadership denounced JDL activities against the Soviet Union and what seemed to be unnecessary violence in the Jewish neighbourhoods of New York. Another factor which decreased Kahane's status in the eyes of the Jewish leadership was his association with Joe Colombo – the head of a Mafia family in New York.

The early 1970s were a period of détente in East-West relations and the JDL's activity was anything but a contribution to easing the tensions between the two sides. According to confidential State Department documents, President Richard Nixon became concerned that Kahane would wreck the Strategic Arm Limitations Talks.⁵ For this reason, the American FBI, whose attitude towards the JDL's violent acts had been quite lenient until then, decided to adopt a new policy towards the league. Evidence was gathered against Kahane, connecting him with a number of illegal activities: holding weapons without a licence; putting bombs in several offices, including those of the PLO and Soviet organizations;⁶

participation in violent rallies; attacking Russian buildings and harassing Russian and Iraqi diplomats; disturbing the peace, etc.⁷ At that time many JDL activists decided to leave the United States in order to escape the trials. Israel served their purpose as a state of refuge.

In July 1971 Kahane stood trial and the verdict was a suspended prison sentence of five years, together with a fine of \$5,000.⁸ He was warned not to deal any more, directly or indirectly, verbally or actively, in any business involving violence and the use of weapons.⁹ Kahane decided to emigrate to Israel and to make Jerusalem his permanent base. In summer 1971 he announced the opening of the JDL 'International Office' at Jerusalem and the adoption of *aliya* (emigration to Israel) as the core of league ideology.

For financial reasons, among others, it was very important for Kahane to keep close contacts with the American organization; consequently he made frequent visits to the United States. In May 1972 an American court decided that Kahane had violated the probation conditions by aiding the dissemination of information about weapons in Brooklyn.¹⁰ The stringency of Kahane's probation conditions was increased. A few years later, in January 1975, during a visit to New York, Kahane created disturbances near the Soviet Mission to the UN. Two shots were directed at the Mission. Kahane was brought before a judge and this time he was sentenced to one year's imprisonment. Kahane tried to appeal against the decision but his motion was denied.¹¹

From the time of his arrival in Israel in September 1971, Kahane was active on the political scene. At first he thought of continuing his terrorist acts. Thus, following the massacre of 11 Israeli athletes at the Munich 1972 Olympic games, Kahane initiated an operation to sabotage the Libyan consulate in Rome. The security forces foiled that attempt at Ben-Gurion airport. Kahane was not arrested in connection with the operation, but the failure certainly had an impact on him, convincing him of the need to be extra cautious in planning his future illegal activities. Nevertheless, he continued to propagate his extreme views, and from time to time he resorted to violent activities. Despite those views and actions, the attitude of the political and judicial systems towards Kahane (like that of the US systems during 1968-71), was quite lenient.¹² The first step to limit Kahane's activity was taken in September 1972, when the military commanders of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip prohibited his entry to the territories. Seven months later, in April 1973, an indictment against Kahane was submitted by the Attorney of the district of Jerusalem. It said that between December 1972 and January 1973 the Jewish Defence League of Israel (Kach) had launched a campaign among the Arabs of Israel, calling on them to emigrate from Israel in return for

compensation. The charge against Kahane was of sedition.¹³

The trial began in May 1973 and was never brought to a conclusion. Itzhak Zamir, who later became the Attorney General,¹⁴ explained that the sedition law was problematic since there was not one newspaper that did not publish daily things that could be seen as a violation of this section. Therefore, this was not the appropriate instrument to deal with Kahane's statements.¹⁵

On 7 June 1973 Kahane was arrested for conspiring to commit acts of violence in the USA and for attempting to harm US-Israeli relations. This was after letters written by Kahane to friends in America were intercepted by the Israeli military censor. In these letters Kahane gave instructions for the blowing up of the Iraqi Embassy in Washington; the assassination of Russian diplomats;¹⁶ a shooting attack on the Soviet Embassy; and the placing of a bomb at the offices of Occidental Petroleum as a warning against deals with the Russians. Kahane was convicted and received a suspended sentence. Judge Bazak said he doubted the seriousness of Kahane's criminal intent because he had sent the letter 'by regular mail, without using any form of code'. He maintained that 'it seems more likely this was an emotional and noisy presentation than it was an actual underground plan'.¹⁷

The same year, two months after the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, Kahane stood for elections for the first time and failed, though he was quite close to his aim. To be elected it was necessary to gain the support of one per cent of the electorate. Kahane received 12,811 votes (0.81% of the votes).

In 1974 Kahane started advocating the idea of Jewish terror against Arab terror. At that time the right-wing movement Gush Emunim ('The Block of the Faithful') was going from strength to strength and Kahane had to find a strategy to distinguish himself, and thus to create a rubric for Kach by crossing the Rubicon. He exacerbated the political atmosphere by initiating violent encounters with Arabs. His position of a strong Jewish stand inspired the first illegal bodies who held that *lex talionis* ('an eye for an eye') is the only answer to the rivalry with the Arabs. Three years later Kahane sought election for the second time. His failure then was more dramatic. He received only 0.25 per cent of the electoral vote (4,396 votes).

However, these election failures did not discourage him, nor did they induce him to change his opinions. On the contrary. The 1979 Camp-David Accords radicalized Kahane even further. He thought that the way to increase his popularity was to resort to more extreme and violent activities. The same methods that had served him well in the United States were adopted in Israel. Kahane advocated militant solutions, used

black-and-white slogans drawing a distinction between 'us' and 'them', and manipulated the media by staging newsworthy events. Kahane always believed that it was not enough to speak; activities had to be undertaken to show 'them' (in Israel the term 'them' refers to the Arabs) that he was serious in his plans, and to attract public media attention. As stated above, neither the political nor the judicial systems learned from the American experience in their dealing with Kahane. Thus Kach enjoyed a great deal of latitude in conducting its activities. Three major violent incidents are worth recalling:

(1) On 18 October 1978 members of Kach, headed by Yossi Dayan, the then General Secretary of the movement, penetrated into 'Abraham Avinu' synagogue, situated at the heart of the city of Hebron. They ignored a military ordinance that declared the place a closed area, attacking soldiers who were instructed to get them out. The maximum penalty for such an act is five years in prison. Dayan was the only person who was convicted. He received a six-month conditional sentence and a fine of 1000 IL.

(2) Dayan learned from this incident that he could continue his activities. On 20 January 1979, despite an ordinance that specifically prohibited him from the Cave of Machpelah in Hebron,¹⁸ Dayan entered the area and prevented a soldier from doing his job. He was prosecuted and this time his sentence was two weeks imprisonment and a fine of 2000 IL. The defendant appealed for amnesty to the local military commander who reduced the punishment.

(3) At the end of March 1979 there was a violent incident in the Temple Mount involving Kach activists. The bill of indictment included threats, religious insults, terrorist attacks, and trespassing. The sentence was 23 days in prison, later reduced to a six months conditional term.

If asked to explain this lenient attitude I would say that the tendency at that time was to repress the issue by not bringing it to the public agenda. It was believed that if Kahane were ignored then his legitimacy would be curtailed. Many people within the establishment seem to have thought that Kahane's opinions did not deserve to be discussed like any other idea in the market-place of ideas, and that any open disputation with them would help Kahane generate a better atmosphere to spread his views. The widely held view was that democracy had to tolerate any idea, but that nothing required anyone to take part in debates on the same platform with Kahane, an action which might be interpreted as suggesting that his ideas had a legitimate place in society. In fact, the outcome was that the problem was ignored.

This was typical of decision making in Israel, a country whose politicians like to postpone confronting problems as long as possible. The

tendency is to fall back on attractive, simple solutions rather than devote time, resources and effort to dealing with problems considered unimportant, or not pressing. Here this tendency was reinforced by a misunderstanding of, or a lack of will to deal with the *core* of the problem, namely, the fact that Kahane's support was based on ideas that have deep roots in Israeli society, views for which Kahane was a catalyst, not a midwife.

The Kahanist phenomenon did not go the way the decision makers wanted. Kahane refused simply to fade away. He became better known to the public and his ideas received wider public attention. Kahane recognized that the seeds of acceptance for his radical ideas had been sown and had germinated. The positive reaction of the public to his ideas encouraged him to intensify the campaign against the Arab population. In an article dated 11 May 1979 entitled 'It Cannot Continue', Kahane called for attacks on Arabs in order to teach them a lesson. In this essay Kahane discussed terrorist attacks on Jewish people all over Israel, complaining that while there were times when such activities led Jews 'to angrily attack Arabs and demand action', the public had now 'grow[n] numb' and accepted terrorist bombs as a natural thing. He angrily advocated one ultimate solution, namely the removal of the hostile Arab minority from the Land of Israel.

Realizing that it would take some time for this plan to be implemented, Kahane postulated an immediate programme which included the death penalty for terrorists, the expulsion of a fixed number of Arabs after every terrorist incident, and '*terror against terror*' (Kahane's emphasis). He explicitly called for the establishment of an anti-terror group whose job would be to retaliate after every incident. Kahane also suggested what the government's attitude should be towards this group: 'The government need never acknowledge its existence or it can deal with it on the same basis as the relationship between the PLO and the Arab host governments'. Recognizing that some would see this advocacy as 'immoral', to 'these products of gentrified culture' Kahane recommended the words of the rabbis: 'He who is merciful at a time when he should be cruel, is destined to be cruel at a time when he should be merciful'.¹⁹

These arguments did not fall on deaf ears. A few years later it was discovered that two Jewish terrorist groups had been organized to retaliate against Arabs. The 'small group' comprised of five Kach activists who set fire to Arabs' cars.²⁰ The 'big group', which was organized in 1980, comprised 27 people. That group took the law into its own hands, setting out to kill and maim Palestinians who were considered to be instigators of terrorist activities. Its members seriously injured two leaders of the National Guidance Committee and launched an attack on the Islamic

College in Hebron in which three Palestinians were killed and some 30 others were wounded. The group also intended to blow up the Dome of the Rock and to booby trap five Arab buses in Jerusalem, so as 'to show the Arabs that terrorism was a two-way street'.²¹ The Jewish terrorists were arrested just after sabotaging the buses and before they exploded.

At the time that this terror group was active (1980-84) there were enough signs to indicate that Kahane himself was involved in organizing attacks against Arabs. It was understood that the lenient policy had to be replaced with a stringent one. In May 1980 the decision was taken to use one of the most anti-democratic procedures that exists in Israel against Kahane and another Kach member. Kahane and Baruch Green were put in administrative detention for six months. Section 2(a) of the 1979 Detention Law provides:

Where the Minister of Defence has reasonable cause to believe that reasons of state security or public security require that a particular person be detained, he may, by order under his hand, direct that such person be detained for a period, not exceeding six months, stated in the order.²²

This was one of the very few occasions on which the measure has been taken against Jews. Detention was implemented after evidence was found to connect Kach with a big arsenal of ammunition in the 'Hacotel' Yeshiva (the Yeshiva of the Wailing Wall). The charge against Kahane and Green was that they had planned assaults against Arabs and the bombing of the Temple Mount mosques. Kahane appealed to the courts, but this time without any success. In his affirmation of the administrative detention, Judge Itzhak Kahan said that the danger to the State's security was so severe in this case, that this extreme means represented the only way of preventing it. He explained:

I do not accept the argument that the provisions of the Law can be used only against someone who wants the destruction of the State of Israel. No such restriction is contained in section 2(a) of the Law . . . [T]hese provisions can be used also to protect state security or public security against persons who, from a belief that they are acting in the interests of the State or in the interests of public security, commit or contemplate acts likely to impair state security or public security according to the test of a reasonable person.²³

In the early 1980s Kahane broadened the scope of his activities. In his appearances and publications he frequently urged the necessity of fighting assimilation, stressing that it was always Arab men who seduced Jewish women. Kahane also emphasised the dual effect of the split-labour

market that had been created after the 1967 Six Day War, asserting that manual workers (mainly of Sephardi origin²⁴) had lost their jobs because of the entrance of cheap Arab labour into society, and that Jews were superior to Arabs. Ideas like these, which clearly entailed discrimination against Arabs, attracted wide public attention and gained a great deal of support.²⁵

However, Kahane still did not succeed in translating that support into electoral gain. In 1981 Kach failed to be elected to the 10th Knesset, receiving merely 5,128 votes (0.26%), only a slight improvement on the 1977 elections. In that year voices were first heard, asserting that Israeli democracy should resort to defensive measures against Kahane's anti-democratic and racist ideas. A petition was submitted to the Supreme Court prior to the elections to disqualify Kach, but it was denied.²⁶ Two years later, the Socialist Party (Mapam) urged the need to outlaw Kach on the grounds that it was a fascist movement, whose ideology, propaganda and deeds were clearly and manifestly racist, leaving no choice but the enactment of a law to prohibit its activities.²⁷ That call was exceptional for its time. The prevailing doctrine was that democracy had to endure any opinion, discriminatory views included.

The case for extending latitude to Kahane's opinions in the free market-place of ideas was based on two different grounds: on the level of principle it was argued that every citizen in a democracy should enjoy the freedom to advocate any idea, however repulsive it might be. Israel would show its society's strength by resisting Kahane's views. This argument was common in political and legal circles and was expressed by the Attorney General who said that in order to defend the value of free speech we should be willing to hear exceptional views that lay outside the mainstream consensus.²⁸

On the pragmatic-political level the claim was that Kahane was only a peripheral phenomenon, who had no real chance of becoming a major force in politics. He could therefore be given the latitude to implement his ideas. The view was that Kahane was, and always would be, a political pawn who would never be able to increase his power substantially. An additional argument, popular among some sections of the public, held that it was a good thing to have someone like Kahane on the scene, so as to put the Arabs in their 'right' place, and to remind them that their situation could become worse if they did not behave as expected.

In April 1982 Kach received considerable public attention as a result of the evacuation of Yamit, the capital of the Rafah settlement, which was to be returned to Egypt. Kach was one of the components of the 'Movement Against the Retreat from Sinai'. Being the most radical faction within the movement, Kach dictated the most dramatic incidents

in that affair. Kahane's followers fortified themselves in an underground shelter, declaring their intention to commit collective suicide as an act of protest. Kahane, who 'happened' to be in New York, was rushed by the Israeli government to Yarnit to persuade his supporters not to commit suicide. The entire negotiation process received wide media coverage in Israel and abroad, and Kahane skilfully master-minded a peaceful solution to the drama.

Two months later the Lebanon War (also known as 'Operation Peace for Galilee') broke out. It opened a new chapter in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, deepening the hostility between Jews and Arabs. The operation was intended to end within three days (according to Prime-Minister Menachem Begin) and lasted three years. The 1984 elections were held under its influence and that was the turning point for Kahane. The Central Elections Committee decided to outlaw his party but the Supreme Court of Justice overruled the decision and allowed Kach to compete in the elections.²⁹ Kach gained the support of 25,907 voters (1.2 per cent of the votes) and as a result Kahane succeeded in entering parliament.

Indeed, looking at Kahane's attempts to be elected, it is easy to discern two peaks: in 1973 and in 1984. The explanation for his relative success in the former and his success in the latter cannot be separated from the wars fought in those years. In both cases there was an atmosphere of agitation against and dissatisfaction with the establishment. In 1973 that atmosphere resulted from the IDF intelligence oversight, and the lack of preparations when faced with the Arab surprise attack launched on Yom Kippur. However, Kahane was new in the country then and had not had time to establish himself in the political arena. In 1984 Kahane enjoyed a much more conducive atmosphere for his views which were by then well known.

The combination of the Lebanon War, together with severe economic problems, made his clear-cut slogans attractive to the people. The war deepened the political and ideological polarization of Israeli society. It contributed to the radicalization of political opinions among Jews and Arabs,³⁰ and within the Jewish population it deepened the split between the left and the right wings. The war also drove a wedge between the leadership and wide sectors of the population. Israeli society, tired of its leaders' vague promises, sought solutions there and then. Kahane was there to offer his decisive plans and to capitalize on them. As the war continued, and every day more names were added to the list of casualties, feelings of hostility and hatred towards Arabs were fuelled. More voices were heard calling for a harder line, based on the motto of 'teaching the Arabs a lesson', and 'speaking to them in a language they understand'.

Kahane became the voice of 'everything you wanted to say but never dared to say in the open'. He supplied the nation, in a state of crisis and yearning for change, with conclusive answers.³¹ In his public addresses Kahane emphasised the anti-Arab message, while concealing his anti-secular notions and the plan to transform Israel into a *Halacha* state.³² Kahane appealed to the feelings of deprivation and bitterness among the lower classes, stressing his claim that Arabs were taking work from Jews, and that the government was helping them by subsidizing their big families through generous social security benefits. Kahane's anti-establishment image helped him exploit the prevailing mistrust and frustration towards the leadership and its policies. In addition, Prime Minister Begin's retirement helped Kahane win the support of Likud followers seeking a new charismatic leader; one who could (at least to some extent) fill the vacuum created by Begin's resignation.

From the very first day of his election to the Knesset, Kahane became the target of fierce attacks. He was the man who (almost) everyone in the establishment liked to hate. The entire Israeli democracy seems to have been recruited to fight him and to curtail the influence of his ideas. The media directors decided to introduce a ban on reviewing the activities of the movement. They spoke of an obligation to fight Kach's racist ideas. Kahane was not permitted to appear on programmes;³³ his statements were not reported; newspapers turned down his requests to respond to the attacks made on him; press conferences and events organized by Kach were not covered. The decision was taken not to supply Kahane with any means to disseminate his views. Schools were supplied with compulsory material to teach children about democracy and civil rights, with the aim of fighting Kahane's discriminatory ideas. Parties, groups and individuals refrained from meeting and debating with Kahane, thinking that any such act might help to legitimize Kach. Organizations which did not usually involve themselves in politics raised their voice in denunciation of Kahanism.³⁴ Furthermore, special organizations were formed to fight his discriminatory ideas. Kahane succeeded in unifying almost all the parties against him, and in creating a consensus against his views. This is no small feat, considering the wide differences between the left and the right wings in Israel. To comprehend this, we shall take a closer look at Kahane's ideology and political platform.

III. The Ideology of Kach

Kahane spoke of a complete change in Israeli society: not merely a political change, but a total remaking of Israel. In Kahane's view, the only authentic Jewish State is 'a state of Jewish totality', where Jewish

leadership is selected on the basis of knowledge of an adherence to the *halachia*, the traditional Jewish Law. He called for the creation of 'a truly Jewish state in Israel rather than a Hebrew-speaking gentilized one', where people would live according to the Jewish laws.⁵⁵ In the *Kach* magazine, *Only Kach* (No. 2, 1986), Kahane asserted that the question of law and order in a Jewish state is not the same as in the United States, France or Australia. As the Jew is different and unique, the question of law and order is different and unique. Kahane explained that in the western democracies, the 'secular-natural' view is that the people give government the right to speak in their name, that the government is the people and that the individual therefore must not nullify government's decisions. The people, in this view, are the ultimate authority, and since the government represents the people, government is the ultimate authority. But this has nothing to do with the Jewish people, whose origins as a nation are *not* natural and evolutionary, and whose authority is not derived from within, but is external to it.

Kahane argued that it is not the Jewish people who decide its future, as is the case of the other nations but, rather, the external power which crystallized it. This is an ultimate authority which is not open to second thoughts or appeals. The entire Jewish nation comes under this authority, including the earthly government. A Jew has to respect and to obey government, *as long as* this government respects and obeys the Law of the Bible, respects and obeys the yoke of divine government. The government loses its authority when it nullifies the Divine Laws.

The implications of these views are of great significance. When the ideologist of the Jewish terrorist group, Yehuda Etzion, was asked whether or not he respected the legitimacy of the government, his answer was that he recognized its legitimacy as the sovereign. But he did not acknowledge the legitimacy of every law: 'Every law has to be analyzed separately, whether or not it coincides with the ultimate yardstick of the Law of the *Torah*, as we understand it'.⁵⁶ Etzion and Kahane believed that the prohibition against the abandonment of lands, and the need to settle in every place in *Eretz* (The Land of) Israel, were more than ordinary commands. These acts amounted to *Kidush Hashem* (sanctification of the Holy Name). This was how the struggle between the settlers and the government had to be viewed. The settlers had a right derived from God Himself to act against the law. Seen in this way, nullifying illegal government orders became a command of the *Torah*. The concept of the Jewish nation was clear in Kahane's mind: government exists to serve the nation; the nation exists to serve the people; the people exist to serve God. When government disobeys the Law, it brings anarchy. It is to blame, for it loses any legal and moral right to demand obedience from

citizens who wish to live according to the Law.⁵⁷

Kahane did not see the democratic principle of majority rule as obligatory, because when the majority acts against the Laws of the Bible, it does not count as a majority. This is a majority of evil, and of course must not enjoy any right to rule. Those who object to that which is required by the Bible are the ones who vilify Law; *they* question the Law; *they* annul order; *they* bring danger and destruction to Israel. It is not a question of Jews who rebel against government who nullify the Law. It is a question of Jews who wish to keep the Law, who disobey government whose conduct breaches the Law and tries to prevent Jews from living in accordance with the Law.⁵⁸

Kahane's views on Israeli society, its laws and practices, as well as its relations with the Arabs living in the land, were directly derived from his picture of Judaism, on the one hand, and his view of non-Jews, on the other. Kahane stated that as a Zionist, his main concern was the future of Israel. To be a Jew, he said, is to understand that Jewishness is different, special. The concepts of chosenness, holiness and separation are an integral part of the Jewish ritual. There is a standard of excellence, holiness and purity, and the mission of the Jewish people is to maintain this standard. Kahane urged:

The Chosen people. Chosen by the father of all as a particular, special child to live the kind of life that raises man to the heights of holiness, that turns him into a thing of beauty, that makes creation comprehensible.⁵⁹

Being associated with the chosen people rules out the possibility of choice. Kahane argued that this concept of being 'chosen' and 'set apart' is the first understanding which the Jew has to grasp, for it establishes his role on the face of the earth. It also sets out well-defined obligations for the Jew. Consequently, in Kahane's view, the concept of choice, or of 'live and let live', is 'the most un-Jewish of all concepts', for all Jews are one. All Jews – as the one, chosen people – are judged together. They stand together; they fall together. The sins of one are visited upon all, and hence 'there are no individual seats or sides in the Jewish boat. The sinners, the choosers of evil, knock holes in the boat and we all go under'.⁶⁰ Since there is no freedom of choice for the Jewish individual, and the sinners condemn not only themselves but others by their wrong doings, it is no wonder that Kahane saw it right to coerce others to live according to the way of life that Judaism, in his view, demands. He clearly stated that should he – through the democratic system – gain power, it is totally acceptable for him to pass laws, within the democratic system, that would make people conform to Judaism.

Kahane claimed that there is a clear intellectual, ideological and philosophical contradiction between Zionism and western democracy, between Judaism and liberal values. In contrast to the liberal tradition, Judaism demands limitation, discipline, and the subordination of the ego. Judaism clearly declares that 'unto the L-rd is the earth and all that it contains'. Consequently there is no such thing as a person's ownership of anything on this earth. Kahane postulated:

We live in a world that revels in 'freedom', in the right to do what we wish. Rights and freedom have become the watchword of our times, and they grow like some cancerous disease into license and moral anarchy. For the Jew there can be no such thing. For the Jew there can only be the yoke of the heavenly kingdom.⁴¹

Kahane further explained that democracy is based on the idea that we are incapable of knowing the truth, whereas Judaism is founded on the idea that we know the truth. Therefore, those who acknowledge it should enlighten others. Kahane strongly believed that democracy is an alien idea born of a gentile mind, that democracy and humanism are the values of the Hellenists.⁴² These values run counter to and stand in contradiction to the basic principles of Judaism-Zionism and a Jewish people. He said that the era of false democracy in which nothing is better than anything else and in which everything and everybody is reduced to a common denominator, invariably the lowest, is not appropriate to Judaism. A Jew must choose between Judaism and Zionism on the one hand, and western liberal culture on the other. They are different: 'The one represents spiritual life and the other death, the one truth and the other falsehood and delusion, the one blessing and the other curse'.⁴³

As for Kahane's view of the Arab population in Israel, he regarded them at best as thieves who entered the Jewish land when the Jews had been forcibly exiled from it. On some occasions he made derogatory references to them. Thus Kahane opened some of his public appearances with the statement: 'Shalom Jews, Shalom Dogs'. The latter part of the statement referred to Arabs attending his assemblies.⁴⁴ The purpose was clearly to dehumanize the Arab population, and one can think of other experts in mass communication who resorted to similar methods. Kahane wrote that the Arabs were 'a time-bomb', 'a malignant disease', and that they 'multiply like fleas'.⁴⁵ In other writings he explained that the Arabs were simply 'our enemies', and they were only to be redeemed from this status through proselytizing. No other way was acceptable to Kahane because he did not trust them. He always said that there were no 'good' and 'bad' Arabs. There were only stupid and clever ones: the stupid declared openly that they wanted to destroy Israel, whereas the clever

ones hid their intentions by speaking of compromise and peace. In truth, no one of them wanted peace. A 'good Arab' was one who wished to establish a country according to the laws of Islam in the place of Israel. There were no Arab moderates, and those who seemed to be moderates only differed in tactics, not in goals. Kahane wrote: 'The enemies of Israel will never make peace; they will never seek less than the total elimination of the Jewish State; they do not want compromise because they look upon us as robbers and bandits.'⁴⁶

Kahane, therefore, urged an end to 'the insane delusion' of peace through concessions. Jews had to recognize that peace was not possible under the given circumstances, and they did not need to 'weep or wail'. Zionism, he declared, 'from the first, was not created primarily for peace but for a Jewish State. Hopefully, it was believed, this could be accompanied by peace. But with or without peace, the primary goal was and is a Jewish State'.⁴⁷ Jews had to adopt a realistic outlook regarding their place and destiny on earth. They had to establish their priorities in a way that would give precedence to these considerations, rather than to universal humanitarian principles. The latter were an obstacle to reaching the former. Thus, in an interview Kahane urged that this was neither the right time nor the right place to apply the rule 'What is hateful to you do not do unto your fellow people'.⁴⁸

Kahane also warned against the threat of Arab population growth which could destroy the Jewish State from within. Evidence showed that the Arab birth rate was more than twice as high as that of the Jews; this meant that they would achieve numerical parity with the Jews before the middle of the next century.⁴⁹ Thus Kahane posed the question: do the Arabs have the right to become the majority in Israel, through peaceful, democratic means? Anyone who feared such a possibility should act *now* to prevent it from materializing.

The proposed solution to the demographic problem was to induce the Arabs to leave, by persuasion if possible, by coercion if necessary. According to this perspective, the non-Jew had no share in the Land of Israel. This Land belonged to the people of Israel; it was they who controlled and defined it. It was their vessel, their territory in which to create the society of Israel, the *Torah* society of God. Kahane said that he did not hate Arabs, rather he loved Jews. And because of that he would do everything to insure that Jews survived. Moreover, the expulsion of the Arabs through the process of transfer would also result in the moral regeneration of Israeli society and would prepare the way for acceptance of the Laws of the *Torah*, the *halacha*, as the Law of the State.⁵⁰

Nevertheless, Kahane was willing to concede that up to a maximum number of Arabs, limited by the security considerations of the State,

might be allowed to continue living in Israel, provided that they were deprived of all political rights and accepted some basic obligations.⁵¹ He stated that Judaism laid down legal, *halachic* conditions for the privilege of being a non-Jew allowed to live in the Land of Israel. These conditions postulated that the non-Jew had no rights of ownership, citizenship, or destiny in the land: whoever wished to live in Israel had to accept basic obligations. He could then live in Israel as an *alien resident* but never as a citizen with any proprietary interest or political say, never as anyone who could hold any public office that would give him dominion over a Jew or a share in the authority of the country.⁵² Accepting these conditions and admitting that the land was not his, the non-Jew could live quietly in Israel, conducting his own private life separately, with all religious, economic, social, and cultural rights. Kahane asserted that '[O]ne is obligated to run miles to help a decent gentile in his personal problems but not an inch in the sphere of national equality'.⁵³

IV. The Political Programme

Kach undertook to carry out the following steps as part of its campaign to reorder society, if it achieved the power to do so:⁵⁴

- Democracy would be frozen so as to allow a truly strong Jewish hand. Kahane explained that Israel should learn from the measures taken by Great Britain during World War II. At that time British democracy froze the democratic political system, suspending elections and major political rights. Israel would have to transfer the power of the people to a new system of strong and forceful government 'to take over the rudder of the ship that, today, drifts toward the shoals and rocks of catastrophe'.⁵⁴
- In the reformed Jewish State, intermarriage and sexual relations between Jews and Gentiles would be forbidden by law. From Kahane's point of view, assimilation with the Arabs was the greatest possible threat: '... that is the worst of the tragedy and the most dangerous'.⁵⁵ Efforts would also be made to put a stop to the process of assimilation between Jews and Christians in the USA.⁵⁶
- Arabs would be excluded from all spheres of work.
- The sovereignty of the Jewish people over the whole Land of Israel should be proclaimed 'by virtue of the promise of the Almighty and the historical fact of tenure and unbroken hope of return based on that promise'.⁵⁷ Jews were forbidden to give up any part of the Land of Israel, including the areas which liberated in 1967;⁵⁸ unlimited Jewish settlement would therefore be allowed throughout the Land of Israel together with a formal announcement of the liberated lands' integration into the State of Israel.

- Camp David agreements would be rejected altogether. There was no place for granting any sort of autonomy to Arabs in the Land of Israel.
- The Israeli Communist Party 'Hadash' would be outlawed, for its members were fifth columnists who cooperated with Israel's deadly enemies.
- The curriculum of all public schools would be thoroughly overhauled and a large percentage of the timetable would be given over to the study of Judaism. This was designed to put an end to the disastrous ideological bankruptcy of young Israelis who had little or no knowledge of, and emotional links with Zionism, Judaism, or Jewishness.⁵⁹ Kahane postulated: 'Jewish pride will be the first order of business'.⁶⁰
- A new state television and radio authority with a positive attitude toward Judaism and Jewish nationalism would be established.
- There would be no stores or restaurants that publicly sold non-kosher food, or which 'wave leavened bread, *chametz*, about on Passover'.⁶¹
- Bookstalls and newspaper kiosks would no longer 'titillate and destroy Jewish minds and souls with pornography', and movies and theatres would no longer be free 'to stand on the soapbox of "freedom of expression and art" to demolish the purity and sanctity of the Jewish soul'.⁶²
- Abortion would be regulated by Jewish law; 'no one will be allowed to murder unborn children'.⁶³
- Missionary work in Israel would be forbidden. Kahane saw it as a crime to allow Christian missionaries into Israel to steal Jewish souls; 'missionaries will be allowed to proselytize in China but not in the Jewish State'.⁶⁴
- The Temple Mount would be freed of its Muslim presence. The latter would be 'taken down from there along with their mosques', which would be 'carefully removed' to another site.⁶⁵
- Normal and acceptable standards of dress would be demanded and the foreign tourists who came to Israel 'will be greeted at the airports with polite welcomes to the Holy Land and with instructions on how they are expected to behave and dress and conduct themselves in our Holy Land'.⁶⁶
- There would be a five-day working week in Israel, with work ending at 2 p.m. on Friday and leisure extending until Monday morning. From Saturday night onwards, Jews would be free to do what they pleased in terms of sports, vacations and leisure, but the Sabbath day would be holy: 'No one will check to see what the Jew does in the privacy of his home but the public character of the Sabbath will be respected and demanded'.⁶⁷
- Finally, it is interesting to note that in the economic sphere Kahane's demand was 'Let the people breathe!'. He contended that Israel was

riddled with economic inefficiency caused by the socialist bureaucratic system, which strangled the individual and prevented him from striking out on his own economic path.⁶⁸ Israel had to cut taxes instead of raising them. People should be allowed to gamble with their money in business, in the hope of making a profit. Kahane held that only free enterprise that brought in foreign investment and that encouraged domestic capitalism and provided incentives, would allow Israel to escape from its present position as 'a beggar basket-case'.

It is no wonder that the Israeli system found these proposals very difficult to digest and fought against them as an act of self-defence. The Israeli establishment viewed Kahane with disgust and shame. Kahanism was conceived as a phenomenon that did not deserve legitimization; one that contradicted everything Israel stood for as a Jewish-democratic state; and one that should be tackled to reduce its influence. Two national figures stepped forward in the campaign against Kahane. These were the President of the State, Chaim Herzog, and the Knesset Speaker Shlomo Hillel. They both believed that the way to fight Kahanism was by excluding Kahane, treating him as a special case and thus denying him legitimacy.

V. Epilogue

In 1988 the Central Elections Committee decided to outlaw Kach. Kahane appealed to the High Court of Justice but this time without success. The appeal was denied on the basis of amendment Number 9 to the Basic Law: The Knesset (1958).⁶⁹ The amendment provides:

- A list of candidates shall not participate in Knesset elections if any of the following is expressed or implied in its purposes or deeds:
1. Denial of the existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people;
 2. Denial of the democratic character of the State;
 3. Incitement to racism.

The banning of Kach paved the way for its authentic successor, Moledet ('Homeland' in Hebrew) whose leader Rehavam Zeevi⁷⁰ is a native-born, ex-general who propounds ideas similar to those of Kahane only without their religious facade. While Kahane as a leader was an alien figure in Israeli society, Zeevi is 'salt of its earth'. He has probably received the support of different segments and classes which elected two members of Moledet to the Knesset.⁷¹ Nevertheless, Zeevi owes Kahane a considerable part of his success in making the idea of an Arab 'transfer' from Israel not only a legitimate but also a very popular one.⁷²

Thus, although Kahane was killed twice, first politically and two years later physically,⁷³ Kahanism is still very much alive in Israel. Since the *Intifada* began in December 1987 feelings of animosity and discrimination against Arabs have been strengthened. At the same time, the Israeli Jewish population's support for democracy has lessened. More people express disappointment with the democratic regime, seeking a 'strong leadership' that will create order without being dependent on elections. About 45 per cent of the population expresses this view.⁷⁴ The majority of the Israeli-Jewish population (54 per cent) think that Jews who are involved in illegal acts against Arabs should be treated more mercifully than Arabs who take the same actions against Jews. That is to say that Kahane and his followers have succeeded in spreading two of their anti-democratic ideas to the extent of convincing the majority of their 'truth'. These ideas are (1) that the law of the State is not binding when it conflicts with principles such as 'an eye for an eye' and the concept of revenge,⁷⁵ and (2) that there is one law for the Jew and another for the Arab. In addition, it is important to report that 46.4 per cent of the population think that newspapers enjoy too much freedom of expression, and 61.2 per cent maintain that the freedom of speech enjoyed by newspapers threatens the security of the State.⁷⁶ These figures must be startling to anyone who holds the values of democracy dear.

NOTES

1. This essay is taken from my dissertation 'The Boundaries of Liberty and Tolerance: Liberal Theory and the Struggle against Kahanism in Israel' (D. Phil. Thesis, Oxford 1991). I am indebted to my supervisors, Geoffrey Marshall and Wilfrid Knapp, for many instructive comments on drafts of this paper. I also thank Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Zeev Oitz for valuable suggestions which helped me clarify specific points.
2. I have studied the Kahanist phenomenon for the last six years, first as an MA student at Tel Aviv University and afterwards during my doctoral studies. Twice I tried to contact Kahane for an interview. On both occasions my attempts were blocked by the General Secretary of Kach, Baruch Marsel. I assumed that Kahane preferred not to cooperate.
3. Kahane wrote that as long as anyone attempted to repeat the Holocaust, 'never again there be that lack of reaction, that same indifference, that same fear'. Cf. *The Story of the Jewish Defense League*, (Radnor, PA: Chilton Book Co., 1975), p. 5.
4. Cf. Shlomo M. Russ, 'The "Zionist Hoodlums": The Jewish Defense League', (City Univ. of NY, Ph.D. Thesis 1981), pp. 170, 310-357; and Janet Dolgin, *Jewish Identity and the JDL*, (N.J. Princeton UP, 1977), ch. 1.
5. What came to be known as 'the Skokie affair' began in April 1977, when Frank Collin, the leader of the National Socialist Party of America (NSP) announced that a march would be held in Skokie, one of the outskirts of Chicago, inhabited mostly by Jews; some hundreds of them being survivors of Nazi concentration camps. I have dealt with this issue in 'Harm Principle, Offence Principle and the Skokie Affair'.
6. Robert I. Friedman, *The False Prophet* (London: Faber, 1990), p. 5.
7. Five notable incidents occurred between October 1970 and April 1971: on 6 Oct. 1970 a

- bomb ripped through the PLO's NY offices; on 23 Nov. 1970 a pipe bomb blasted the glass of the Intourist and Aeroflot offices; on 8 Jan. 1971 a bomb exploded outside the Soviet cultural building in Washington, DC. The same month three Soviet diplomats' cars were destroyed by firebombs. On 30 March a pipe bomb exploded outside the Communist Party national offices in Washington; and on 22 April 1971 a bomb went off at the Soviet freight office. The same week a heavy explosion rocked the Soviet trade delegation in Amsterdam. Each of the above explosions was followed by a phone call, declaring 'Never Again'.
7. On 21 March 1971 more than a *thousand* league members and supporters were arrested when they blocked traffic near the Soviet Mission in Washington, DC.
 8. Kahane and 11 of his men were charged with conspiracy to violate provisions of the Federal Firearms Act of 1968. The government was willing to dismiss indictments against nine of the defendants if three would plead guilty. Those three (Kahane, Biecher and Cohen) were convicted under Title I of the Act (transportation of firearms across state lines), and under Title II, (legal procedures regarding the making of firearms). Cf. Russ, 'Zionist Hooligans', pp. 487-535; Friedman, *False Prophet* p. 122.
 9. A few years later Judge Weinstein explained his decision not to put Kahane behind bars by saying that the fact that Kahane appeared to be motivated by considerations of the welfare of others rather than himself, and the recommendations of authorities that probation be utilized in such circumstances were among the reasons which persuaded the court to decide on probation. Cf. *United States v. Kahane*, 396 F. Suppl. 687 (1975).
 10. In Jan. 1972 explosions at two offices of impresarios for Soviet performers killed one person and injured over a dozen people. Insufficient evidence was found to connect Kahane directly to these incidents, although it was clear that the IDL was responsible for them.
 11. *United States v. Kahane* 527 F. 2d 491 (1975).
 12. As late as 1979, a superior court judge in Los Angeles dismissed a felony complaint against Irving Rubin, a JDL leader, who had been charged with soliciting the murder of American Nazis. At a press conference Rubin said that 'we are offering \$500, that I have in my hand, to any member of the community . . . who kills, maims, or seriously injures a member of the American Nazi Party'. The judge accepted the ACLU attorney's argument that these utterances were political hyperbole, intended to attract national media exposure and evidencing a lack of serious intent to solicit the commission of crime. Thus, they were protected by the First Amendment. A state appellate court, however, by a 2-1 vote, overruled the lower court's ruling. Cf. *People of the State of California v. Rubin* 96 Cal. App. 3d 968 (1980), cert. denied 101 S. Ct. 80 (1980).
 13. It has to be noted that in 1973 the British Criminal Code Ordinance of 1936 was still in force. It was replaced in 1977 by the Penal Law. Seditious intention was defined, *inter alia*, as either raising discontent or disaffection among inhabitants of the state, or promoting feelings of ill-will and hostility between different sections of the population. Cf. Part II, ch. viii, section 60 (1). Compare to Section 136 (3) and (4) of Article One of the Penal Law, in *Laws of the State of Israel*, Special volume: Penal Law.
 14. The roles of the Attorney General in Israel (the title in Hebrew is 'Legal Advisor to the Government') are broader than those of the Attorney-General in England. He is the main legal figure in Israel. He is not, however, a political figure.
 15. Quoted in Yair Kotler, *Heil Kahane* (Tel Aviv: Modan, 1985), p. 290 (in Hebrew).
 16. Kahane wrote: 'Where are the Jews who strike now immediately at a Soviet diplomat, causing Brezhnev to cancel his trip to the USA that stops the detente that will decimate Soviet Jewry'. Cf. *Protokol No. 14* of the Central Elections Committee, 17 June 1984, p. 11 (in Hebrew).
 17. Cr. A. 167/1973. The Jerusalem District Court (the case was not published). Cf. Friedman, p. 158.
 18. The burial place of the Patriarchs and their wives.
 19. 'I Cannot Continue', published by Kach International, PO Box 425, Brooklyn, NY.
 20. Cf. Naomi Gal-Or, *The Jewish Underground: Our Terrorism*, (Tel Aviv: Hakibutz Hamuchad, 1990), pp. 33-34 (in Hebrew). According to Friedman, this group, which

- called itself TNT (Terror against Terror) committed hundreds of terrorist bombings and beatings, as well as several murders (p. 239).
21. Cf. Haggai Segal (*Dear Brothers*, NY: Beit-Shamai Publications, 1988), p. 181.
 22. Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 5739-1979. This law, in fact, replaced a less liberal procedure, enacted by the British mandate authorities as Emergency Regulations, *Kahane and Green v. Minister of Defence*. Appeal on Administrative Detention, No. 1/1980, at 261. The then view was that the court's only business was to check the formal requirements of the ordinance. The prevailing opinion was that if the Defence Ministry decided to take such a measure, there was bound to be sufficient reason to believe that this act was necessary to protect public safety. Nowadays the Court does consider the discretion of the Defence Minister. The Court is willing to scrutinize this discretion and sometimes questions are raised with regard to the need for such an extreme measure.
 24. It is common to distinguish between three segments in Israeli Jewish society: Sephardim, Ashkenazim and sabras. Roughly speaking, Sephardim are Jews whose origins are from Asia and Africa, whereas Ashkenazim are Jews from Europe and America. Those who are born in Israel are called sabras.
 25. After the 1967 Six Day War managers and contractors preferred to hire cheap Arab workers who did not demand social benefits and who were willing to work in any employment for salaries that Jews rejected with contempt. For the same work there were different salaries for Jews and Arabs. Some characterized the situation by saying that there were certain jobs that were suitable for Arabs; jobs that Jews would not be willing to take. From a psychological perspective this affected the lower class, comprised mainly of Sephardi Jews, who found that they no longer occupied the lowest class of society. As a result, feelings of superiority developed; there was one status for Jews and another for Arabs. Kahane propagated ideas that helped to legitimize these feelings. His entire ideology emphasized the Jew's special role in the world in general and in Israel in particular: *ipso facto*, it defined the status of the Arabs in society.
 26. HC 344/1981, *Negbi v. Central Committee for the Elections to the 10th Knesset*, PD 35 (iv), 837.
 27. *Davar*, 4 Aug. 1983, p. 2.
 28. Itzhak Zamir on 30 June 1983. Cf. *Negbi, Paper Tiger: The Struggle for a Press Freedom in Israel*, (Tel Aviv: Siftat Poalim, 1985), p. 120 (in Hebrew).
 29. EA (Election Appeal) 2/1984, *Neiman and Avneri v. Chairman of the Central Committee for the Elections to the 11th Knesset*, PD 39 (ii), 225. The Court's decision is discussed in my dissertation, ch. 11.
 30. The Lebanon War did two main things: first, it made the Palestinians realize that nobody was going to do their job for them. The PLO had to evacuate its forces to distant places, and thus the inhabitants of the occupied territories understood that the burden was now on them to do something. Second, the Palestinians realized that they did not necessarily need a big, well-equipped army to harm the 'best army in the Middle East'. Terrorist acts, guerilla warfare, or mass civil violence could do enough damage; the Lebanese swamp brought about a change of consciousness, a necessary condition for any uprising.
 31. The American Council for Foreign Relations conducted a 1984-85 research project on Israeli society. Its conclusions were that the people were emotional and indecisive, deeply split in regard to their political, material, and spiritual preferences. It also asserted that the gaps within the Jewish population, not to mention the gap between Jews and Arabs, had deepened. In addition, the research warned of the danger of fundamentalist Jews disobeying the law (*Yediot Ahronoth*, 10 May 1985, Pol. Suppl. p. 2).
 32. The ignorance shown by many of Kahane's secular followers regarding his plans to transform Israel into a theocracy was striking. Many who were aware of his programme believed that it was more important to deal with the Arabs. Afterwards, they assumed, a *modus vivendi* would be found between a religious state and the current situation. They assumed that the 'sacred' status quo would be kept.
 33. In Britain a similar ban is put on IRA members.

34. One day after the election, 'The Second Generation to the Holocaust Remembrance' organization decided to raise its voice for the first time over a political matter. This voluntary organization, comprising some 2,000 people, second and third generations of Holocaust survivors, published a press notice saying that it was appalled by the thought that quasi-fascist ideas, similar to those expressed in another place, at another time, should be represented in the Israeli Knesset. It maintained that for too long Israel had resisted the idea that there could be such a thing as Jewish-fascism. Now was the time for the Israeli system to oust this phenomenon.
35. A Kach undated flyer entitled 'A Message to the Jewish Community from Rabbi Meir Kahane' (in English).
36. Aviva Shabi, 'In Tel-Mond I established the redemption movement', *Yedioth Ahronoth*, 6 Jan 1989, (Pol. Suppl. p. 12).
37. On 25 Aug. 1989, in the *Jewish Press*, Kahane openly called for revolution in Israel because the government 'is incapable or unwilling to protect to the utmost, and in every way possible, the lives of its citizens'. Since, in Kahane's view, the only way to suppress the Palestinian *Intifada* was to expel each and every Arab, something that the government was not willing to do, Kahane contended the government 'loses every legal and moral right to rule'. Cf. Friedman, *Fake Prophet*, p. 269.
38. Kahane wrote (*The Story of the Jewish Defense League*, 1975): 'Those who love Israel must learn to distinguish between the state and the government. The state is inviolate but the government is not' (p. 323).
39. Kahane, *Listen World, Listen Jew* (NY: Inst. of the Jewish Idea, 1983), p. 15.
40. Kahane, *Uncomfortable Question for Comfortable Jews* (Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart, 1987), pp. 262-63.
41. Kahane, *Listen World*, p. 19. In another place (*Uncomfortable Question*, p. 129) Kahane wrote that Judaism defines freedom as follows: "'For no man is free but he who occupies himself in the study of Torah' (Avot 6:2). The only freedom recognized by Judaism is that which is within the bounds, the framework of *halacha*'.
42. 'Hellenism' was one of Kahane's favoured terms. It has to be explained that this is not the precise translation of the parallel term in Hebrew. The Hebrew word conveys, in addition to the cultural notion, a notion of betrayal. Jews who conformed to Greek culture and religion were considered as traitors. Some of them were executed as such by the Maccabees.
43. Kahane, *Uncomfortable Question*, p. 179.
44. This was the case in the assemblies held in the Hebrew University, Haifa and Acre.
45. To an English newspaper Kahane said that the Arabs 'multiply like rabbits', and that Jewish women who live with Arabs are 'Jews who live with animals'.
46. Kahane, *Listen World*, p. 139.
47. Kahane, *Uncomfortable Question*, p. 271.
48. Raphael Mergui and Philippe Simonnot, *Israel's Ayatollahs* (London: Saqi Books, 1987), p. 87.
49. This assumption did not forecast the mass *aliya* from the Soviet Union, which started in 1989. In an article (without date or place of publication) prior to the emigration movement entitled 'For Israel: A Government of National Emergency', Kahane in his picturesque language contended: 'The demon of demography roars with satanic laughter as the huge Arab birthrate and the pitiful Jewish one . . . combine to threaten the continued existence of Israel as a Jewish State.' He maintained that 'The blunt contradiction between Zionism-Judaism and western democracy is glaring as Israel faces a clear threat to its existence either through Arab bullets or babies'.
50. Kahane wrote in *They Must Go*, (NY: Inst. of the Jewish Idea, 1981): 'The Arabs of Israel represent *Hilul Hashem* (declamation of God) in its starkest form . . . Their transfer from the Land of Israel thus becomes more than a political issue. *It is a religious issue, a religious obligation, a commandment to erase Hilul Hashem* . . . Let us remove the Arabs from Israel and bring the redemption' (pp. 275-76, Kahane's emphasis).
51. *Ibid.*, p. 252.
52. Kahane's image of an alien-resident was someone who was not a citizen and did not cast

- a vote for the Knesset. Someone who had personal rights to culture, religion, economy and society, but no political rights. The purpose of this concept served Kach purposes adequately. The concept was based on religious grounds, and it was sufficient to exclude Arabs from potential political influence thus avoiding the hazardous result of changing the Jewish character of Israel.
53. Kahane, *Uncomfortable Question*, p. 173.
54. From 'For Israel: A Government of National Emergency'. This article was written under the influence of the Palestinian *Intifada*.
55. Kahane, *Uncomfortable Question*, p. 206. Kahane established the 'Jewish Guard of Honour' to fight the danger of assimilation. He claimed that there were about 7,000 to 8,000 mixed marriages with Arabs in Israel, and that this should be regarded as a crime. Cf. interview with Kahane in Mergui and Simonnot, p. 80.
56. Kahane, *Listen World*, p. iv. An undated Kach flyer (in English) entitled 'Don't Dare Gentiles' states: 'Intermarriage is the spiritual Auschwitz of the Jewish People'. The message to the 'Young Jew' clearly postulates that 'Life is not ours to do with as we see fit. Only the sick, selfish animalist babbles about his "right" to do with his life whatever he wishes without any restraint or obligation. It is not "my" life or "my" business or "my" right. We are not islands unto ourselves'. This is because 'You are a link to a glorious past and the initiator of a glorious future', and 'You have no right' to throw away that Judaism which your grandparents so struggled for and died for . . . You have no right to rob your children and theirs and all the generations who will come from you . . . (emphases are within the text).
57. Kahane, *Listen World*, p. 137.
58. Notice the nuance: the parties of the right in Israel refer to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as 'the liberated territories', whereas parties of the left refer to them as 'the occupied territories'.
59. Kahane, 'For Israel: A Government of National Emergency'.
60. Kahane, *Uncomfortable Question*, p. 268.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 271.
62. *Ibid.*
63. *Ibid.*, p. 272; and Kahane, *Listen World*, p. 20.
64. Kahane, *Uncomfortable Question*, p. 272. See also *Story of the JDL*, p. 310.
65. Kahane, *Uncomfortable Question*, pp. 272-73.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 272.
67. *Ibid.* (emphasis mine).
68. *Ibid.*, p. 273.
69. Section 7A of Basic Law: The Knesset, 1155 *Sifur HaChukim*, 1985.
70. Interestingly enough, 'zevev' in Hebrew means wolf but his popular nickname is 'Gandhi'. Kahane gained the support of the poor and deprived classes of society, while we can assume that the votes for 'Gandhi' came from people of the middle-class. Cf. Gershon Shafr and Yoav Peled, "'Thorins in Your Eyes . . .': Socio-Economic Characterizations of the Voting Sources for Rabbi Kahane' in *State, Government, and International Relations*, Vol. 25 (1986), pp. 115-29 (in Hebrew).
72. A study conducted by the newspaper *Maariv*, 13 Jan. 1986, revealed that 42 per cent of the population thought that the Arabs should be induced to leave Israel. Another piece of research from June 1988 showed that 41 per cent of Jewish citizens supported the idea of transfer. The research also indicated that 27 per cent of high school pupils declared their intention to emigrate; and 45 per cent thought that Israel was too democratic. (Keinan, Amos, 41 per cent, 45 per cent, 27 per cent, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, 10 June 1988, Pol. Suppl. p. 17). However, I should say that much depends on the phrasing of the question. *Yedioth Ahronoth* reported on 16 Nov. 1990 that 20 per cent supported the transfer (Pol. Suppl. p. 3).
73. Kahane was murdered in Brooklyn, New York on 6 Nov. 1990.
74. In the last decade, a poll has been conducted every year to reflect on how far values are rooted in Israeli society. The results have repeatedly shown that some 30 per cent of the Jewish population hold anti-democratic views. The *Intifada* led to a significant change.

with the effect that, in Jan. 1990, 45 per cent expressed willingness to have 'strong leadership that will not be dependent on elections'. On the Palestinian uprising's impact on Israel society see my 'The *Intifada*: Causes, Consequences, and Future Trends', *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 2/1 (April 1991), pp. 12-40.

75. It has to be said that there are people from the left who explicitly advocate disobeying the law on conscientious grounds, when the demand is to serve in the occupied territories or in Lebanon. Members of this group, 'Yesh Gvul' ('There Is A Limit'), do not resort to violence and certainly do not advocate discrimination. But, like rightist extremists, they argue that there are some values that stand beyond the law. By adhering to this claim, they help to undermine the rule of law and order in Israel. Cf. Itzhak Zamir, 'Boundaries of Obedience to Law', in Barak (ed.), *Essays in Honour of Shimon Agranat* (Jerusalem, 1986), pp. 119-28 (in Hebrew).
76. Dov Goldstein, 'Democracy Goes Bankrupt', *Maariv*, 25 Jan. 1990; and Itzhak Ben-Horin, 'Democracy Goes Down', *Maariv*, 10 Feb. 1990.

The Problems of 'Pro-State' Terrorism: Loyalist Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland

STEVE BRUCE

The essay briefly outlines the careers of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), the two largest Protestant, unionist and loyalist paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland. It argues that a range of apparently unconnected characteristics of the UDA and UVF can be explained by reference to the notion of 'pro-state terrorism'. When the state is perceived to be unable or unwilling to defend itself against its enemies, there is space for 'pro-state' private initiatives in violence. If the state is not seen to be terminally weak or treacherous, the 'pro-state' group is competing with the state itself. That competition explains many features of the history of the UDA and UVF.

This essay is in two parts: a brief history of loyalist paramilitarism in Northern Ireland and an attempt to explain apparently unconnected aspects of that history by reference to the notion of 'pro-state terrorism'.

History of Loyalist Paramilitarism

Around the turn of the century it became likely that a British government would give independence or 'home rule' to Ireland. The Protestants of Ulster and elsewhere began to mobilise against the home rule movement and as part of that mobilization in 1912, a popular and probably illegal army – the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) – was raised.¹

This first UVF was a genuinely 'mass' organization. Well over 200,000 people joined it and it enjoyed support from every social stratum and regional group. It was officered by the Ulster aristocracy and trained by retired British army officers in the gardens of stately homes. Rebellion was avoided by the greater crisis of the First World War: the UVF was incorporated into the British Army as 36th (Ulster) Division and its men fell nobly at the Battles of the Somme. After the war, the British government gave in to Protestant pressure and partitioned the island, giving independence to three-quarters but allowing Ulster to remain in the United Kingdom. In 1920 and 1921, as partition was being worked out, there was considerable violence in the north and Protestants re-organized the old UVF units as a peace-keeping vigilante movement. Once again there was elite support and once again these units were incorporated by the government, this time as the B Special Constabulary.²